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Three Models of Privacy 
New Perspectives on Informational Privacy
Jens-Erik Mai
This panel is based on two observations: (i) that digital media are designed such that they 
track and record people’s interactions, behaviour and preferences; they are by design 
surveillance machines, and (ii) that different perspectives can be taken when observing 
people’s interactions with digital media; from above (surveillance), from below (sous-
veillance), or by peers (coveillance). 
In this commentary, I will advance the idea that as we think about and research the 
ethical implications of digital media by focusing on their inherent surveillance capacities, 
we need to be conscious about the conceptual perspective we take. While the title of this 
panel suggests that perspective is important – whether we are looking from above as a 
Big Brother or from below or as peers, as Little Sisters – I suggest that perspective is just 
one among a number of important conceptual constructions that needs consideration. To 
help guide this dialogue I will present three models of privacy that can advance thinking 
and research about digital media’s implications for privacy protection. 
Privacy has historically been conceptualised as freedom from intrusion, protection 
of the private sphere, the right to be left alone, and other similar notions (Solove 2008). 
Agre (1994) argued that the typical model for privacy has been the “surveillance model” 
(Agre 1994: 105), which has focused on data collection and the use of that data. I will 
in this commentary propose that a different model of privacy is needed when it comes 
to big data and digital media, namely a datafication model of informational privacy.
Informational privacy
There are currently two major conceptualisations of the privacy of (personal) informa-
tion: one that regards privacy as the ability to “limit or restrict others from information 
about” oneself (Tavani 2008: 141) and another that views privacy as the “control of 
personal information” (Solove 2008: 24). Both concepts operate on the assumption that 
information is something that can be controlled or to which access can be restricted. 
Data or information are typically regarded as objective entities that exist and it is as-
sumed, though often unarticulated, that there is a direct and true correspondence between 
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the data or information and the actual state of affairs in the world – hence the notion 
of footprints. Footprints presume that there is a neutral and direct one-to-one relation 
between the traces left behind by human activity, the footprint and the actual state of 
that human activity. The basic premise is that people enjoy privacy when they have the 
abilities to control and/or restrict access to data or information about themselves – that is, 
when they control and/or restrict access to the footprints they leave behind (Mai 2016b).
In the age of big data, personal information has become a commodity that is traded 
on the market of information empires and between data brokers. Personal information is 
something that holds monetary value: “personal information can be viewed as a kind of 
property that a person can own and negotiate within the economic or commercial sphere” 
(Tavani, 2008: 134). The digital information society has brought about an information 
utopia where the use of computers and network technologies track all the activities hu-
mans engage in, though Winner (1986) suggested as early as the the mid-1980s that “as 
a badge of civic pride a citizen may announce, ‘I’m not involved in anything a computer 
would find the least bit interesting’” (Winner 1986: 115).
Personal information, however, is not only valuable as singular pieces of data. In-
formation about my age, marital status, profession, income, mortgage, address, credit 
score, health record, hobbies, employer etc. has some value in particular situations, but 
those data are only really valuable when they are assembled into a big dataset where 
predictive analytics is possible. In other words, when I control or restrict access to 
information about my recent purchases at the local petrol station I may enjoy privacy 
at that moment. I may decide to pay in cash, to decline their offer of a discount card, 
shield my face and licence plate from the CCTV cameras, etc. to protect my privacy 
and personal information. However, at that moment it may seem to be a relatively small 
piece of personal information to provide the petrol station with information about my 
purchases at that particular petrol station, for which the petrol station in return offers a 
decent discount on the already very expensive fuel. I may therefore decide to give away 
that small and insignificant piece of personal information to the petrol station. I get a 
discount and they get to know my fuel purchase pattern. Who cares how many litres of 
petrol I purchase anyway? However, once that information enters the pile of big data 
about me and my consumer segment, it is possible to gain insights about me that I may 
never have provided to anyone. The really interesting part is not what I purchased at the 
petrol station, but how that information together with other individual pieces of personal 
information that I have sold on the information market can reveal new information and 
insights about me. While I may control or restrict access to information about my fuel 
purchases, how would I control the new information and insights that can be computed 
about me from the pile of big data?
The traditional approach to restricting, limiting and controlling access to personal 
information “has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s” (Solove 2013: 1880). The 
traditional approach has been to ask people to consent to the collection and use of their 
personal information and the basic assumption has been that people are able to “make 
conscious, rational and autonomous choices about the processing of their personal data” 
(Schermer, Custers & van der Hof 2014: 171). This approach obviously fails today, now 
people are asked to enter several consent agreements on a daily basis as they navigate 
the digital information environment and use digital media. In some instances, people 
consent without reading the agreements in full, and often they do not understand the 
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details of the agreements they enter. In other words, the traditional approach to privacy 
needs to be reconceptualised and reconsidered. 
The important question, however, is not whether big data and digital media increase 
the risk to privacy, because the right to privacy is clearly at risk in the digital information 
society. The real question is whether big data and digital media fundamentally change 
the character of the risk. If the risk to privacy is merely larger in the digital information 
society, then the laws and rules that currently protect privacy may still work in the new 
information age; all we need to do is to redouble our existing efforts. However, there 
are clear indications that the problem has changed. The traditional approach to privacy 
protection through consent and the ability to restrict, limit and control personal infor-
mation comes short given new information and communication technologies. In other 
words, we need new solutions and new conceptual approaches to understand privacy in 
the digital information society.
Three models of privacy
While there have been a number of proposals for new and improved understandings and 
definitions of informational privacy in the digital information society, it is my sense that 
we need to change the metaphors we use to discuss privacy. I will here follow Agre’s 
(1994) programmatic paper, in which he argues that the notion of privacy ought to be 
re-conceptualised from a “surveillance model” (Agre 1994: 101) to a “capture model” 
(Agre 1994: 101). I build on Agre’s work and extend it with a “datafication model” of 
privacy – I have discussed these models in more depth in a recent paper (Mai 2016a). 
The objective behind the shift in focus from definitions of privacy to models of 
privacy is to shift focus from establishing characteristics of privacy with the purpose 
of determining the definition that captures all aspects of privacy, regardless of time 
and place, to focus on how privacy works and how thinking about privacy shapes the 
language we use to discuss privacy. The purpose is not to provide a new and improved 
definition of informational privacy, but to suggest that in the digital information society 
we need to think differently about privacy – and I want to show that there is a need for 
a datafication model of privacy for that purpose.
I will use Agre’s (1994) original, rather loose definition of a model, which is simply: 
“A ‘model,’ for present purposes, is a way of looking at things; specifically, it is a set 
of metaphors. Distinct models do not divide the world’s sociotechnical phenomena into 
nonoverlapping classes.” (Agre 1994: 105). Different models may look at the same 
phenomena in the world, but they will focus on different aspects and highlight different 
characteristics. The language used to discuss the phenomena will differ, and different 
models will use different metaphors to describe the phenomena. Agre operates with 
metaphorical components that together outline the two models of privacy. Unlike defini-
tions, the aim is not to describe or prescribe the characteristics of privacy, but to provide 
metaphors that indicate how privacy functions. These following three models of privacy 
can help us think through the problem space and help us devise possible solutions:
The panopticon model: the metaphor of watching. This is the traditional understand-
ing of privacy and surveillance, and also the model embedded in the language and con-
ceptualisation of this panel. This model applies visual metaphors such as Orwell’s “Big 
Brother is watching you” and Bentham’s panopticon. The basic idea is that surveillance 
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and the breach of privacy is conducted by someone “watching” someone else, and it is 
assumed that the watching is “nondisruptive and surreptitious” (Agre 1994: 105). The 
model applies metaphors such as “the ‘invasion’ of a ‘private’ personal space”, focuses 
on the “opposition between ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’”, and employs the notion of a 
bureaucracy’s centralized orchestration of sets of ‘files’ and is as such often identified 
with “the state, and in particular with consciously planned-out malevolent aims of a 
specifically political nature” (Agre 1994: 106).
The focus of the panopticon model of privacy is therefore on the tensions between 
the watchers and the watched, between public and private spheres, and on inherent 
power relations.
The capture model: the notion of a grammar of action. The capture model changes fo-
cus to be primarily concerned with how human activities are constructed in “a computer 
system’s representation languages”, and as such, the model applies structural metaphors 
and describes the captured activity as assembled from a “‘catalog’ of parts provided 
as part of its institutional setting” (Agre 1994: 107). The organization of activities is 
decentralised and heterogeneous and the activities take place “within particular, local 
practices that involve people in the workings of larger social formations”, and unlike 
the panopticon model, the capture model is “not political but philosophical” and the 
captured activity is “reconstructed through assimilation to a transcendent (‘virtual’) 
order of mathematical formalism” (ibid.).
In the capture model of privacy the focus is on the codification of activities, the so-
ciotechnical nature of computer technology, and the unclear purposes of data collection. 
The datafication model: the metaphor of patterns of behaviour. While both the panop-
ticon and the capture model of privacy have focus on the collection of data, the datafica-
tion model of privacy has its focus on processing and analysis of data, and as such on 
the production of new personal information. Data collection is ontologically oriented, 
it focuses on data as representing facts about the state of affairs in the world: people 
and activities and the interrelation between places, times, other people, activities and 
intentions. The datafication model changes the focus to the data processing and analyses 
and as such is epistemological oriented; it focuses on the facts or realities that data can 
generate once it is processed and analysed.
In the datafication model of privacy the focus is on the anonymous creation of new 
personal information, the reinterpretation and statistical analysis of data, and the com-
modified nature of personal information.
Conclusion
The three models of privacy presented here are not competing views or approaches to 
informational privacy; they present three different views of the same problem sphere. 
The three models highlight different aspects and different perspectives of the privacy 
situation, and as such allow us to research and focus on different aspects of the conse-
quences of big data and digital media in the contemporary digital information society. 
The purposes of introducing these three models of privacy to this panel on Big 
Brother and Little Sisters are (i) to allow us to question the presumptions and under-
standings about privacy and surveillance that are inherent in notions such as Big Brother 
and Little Sisters, and (ii) to present a conceptual framework of privacy that allows 
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us to handle privacy challenges created by the production of new knowledge that big 
data analysis and digital media usages generates. These three models of privacy – and 
perhaps especially the datafication model of privacy – could form the ethical basis for 
new digital media research and practice. 
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